Setting the Bar in North Carolina Medical Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care That Everyone Loves to Hate by Hyman, Casey
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 89 | Number 1 Article 8
12-1-2010
Setting the Bar in North Carolina Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard
of Care That Everyone Loves to Hate
Casey Hyman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Casey Hyman, Setting the Bar in North Carolina Medical Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care That Everyone Loves to
Hate, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 234 (2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol89/iss1/8
Setting the "Bar" in North Carolina Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care that Everyone
Loves to Hate
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 234
I. THE ROAD TO SECTION 90-21.12 .............. ......... 239
A. The Use of Experts in Medical Malpractice ..... ...... 239
B. The Demise of the Locality Rule............. ................. 243
C. North Carolina's "Same or Similar Community" Rule ..... 244
D. Lingering Uncertainty .......................... 246
II. A WEALTH OF OPPOSITION: A DISCUSSION OF
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE "SAME OR SIMILAR
COMMUNITY" STANDARD OF CARE .................... 249
III. A WORKABLE SYSTEM ............................... 252
A. Abandoning the "Same or Similar Community"
Standard of Care Is Not the Answer .......................... 252
1. A National Standard of Care Is Not the Answer ........ 253
2. A Discussion of Alternative Approaches .... .... 259
a. Objective Geographic Survey Approach.................260
b. Reasonableness Approach ........... .......... 261
c. Daubert Approach.................. ...... 262
B. Living in Harmony: Reconciling the "Same or Similar
Community" Standard with National Standardization
of Health Care ................................ 263
C. How Section 90-21.12 Can Be Efficiently Implemented
into North Carolina Medical Malpractice Law...................266
1. Establishing Familiarity ............... ..... 266
2. The Essential Link ............. ............269
3. Why Do It This Way? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .. .270
CONCLUSION .................................................. 273
INTRODUCTION
In January 2008, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was
poised to review two medical malpractice cases,' O'Mara v. Wake
* © 2010 Casey Hyman.
1."[T]he term 'medical malpractice action' means a civil action for damages for personal
injury or death arising out of the furnishing or failure to furnish professional services in
the performance of medical, dental, or other health care by a health care provider." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 (2009).
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Forest University Health Sciences2 and Crocker v. Roethling.3 The
court was reviewing each case on the issue of whether an expert
witness was appropriately qualified to testify on the relevant standard
of care required of the defendant-physician.4 These cases epitomized
the confusion surrounding the North Carolina requirement that
expert witness testimony in medical malpractice cases speak to
whether the defendant breached the standard of care for a doctor in
the "same or similar communit[y]."s This confusion stemmed from
decisions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Henry v.
Southeastern OB-GYN Associates6 and Pitts v. Nash Day Hospital,
Inc.' These cases reinforced the requirement of section 90-21.12 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina that an expert must be familiar
with the standard of care in the defendant-physician's medical
community, or a community similar to the defendant-physician's
medical community.' Likewise, the cases emphasized that knowledge
of a national or statewide standard of care, by itself, is not adequate
to qualify an expert to testify in a North Carolina medical malpractice
trial.' As a result of these decisions, North Carolina courts have since
stringently applied section 90-21.12 in establishing that an expert
witness is qualified to testify on the appropriate standard of care.10
2. 184 N.C. App. 428, 646 S.E.2d 400, disc. review granted in part, 362 N.C. 85, 659
S.E.2d 1 (2007), and disc. review improvidently allowed by 363 N.C. 117, 678 S.E.2d 658
(2009).
3. 184 N.C. App. 377, 646 S.E.2d 442, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 644 (2007)
(unpublished table decision), rev'd, 363 N.C. 140, 675 S.E.2d 625 (2009).
4. Specifically, O'Mara was reviewed, in part, on the issue of whether expert
testimony was correctly excluded when the expert answered affirmatively when asked by
defense counsel during the discovery deposition if he was applying a national standard of
care. O'Mara, 184 N.C. App. at 435, 646 S.E.2d at 404. Similarly, Crocker was reviewed on
whether summary judgment for the defendants was proper due to the expert failing to
sufficiently establish knowledge of the standard of care in Goldsboro, North Carolina.
Crocker, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 644, at *7-8.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009). This Comment refers to the standard of care
imposed on physicians in North Carolina by section 90-21.12 as the "same or similar
community" standard of care.
6. 145 N.C. App. 208, 550 S.E.2d 245, affd per curiam, 354 N.C. 570, 557 S.E.2d 530
(2001).
7. 167 N.C. App. 194, 605 S.E.2d 154 (2004), aff'd per curiam, 359 N.C. 626, 614
S.E.2d 267 (2005).
8. See Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 212, 550 S.E.2d at 248; Pitts, 167 N.C. App. at 197,
605 S.E.2d at 156.
9. See Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 212, 550 S.E.2d at 248; Pitts, 167 N.C. App. at 197,
605 S.E.2d at 156.
10. See, e.g., Purvis v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Serv. Corp., 175 N.C. App. 474,
480-81, 624 S.E.2d 380, 385 (2006) (upholding summary judgment for the defendants for
failure of plaintiffs expert witness to qualify to testify on the standard of care required by
§ 90-21.12); see also Mark McGrath, Back to the Horse and Buggy Days: North Carolina
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After Henry and Pitts, however, confusion remained over how to
establish the expert's familiarity with the standard of care of a "same
or similar community," as required under section 90-21.12." This
ongoing confusion came from the fact that no clear guidelines had
been established to enable lawyers to know with certainty whether a
medical community was the same as or similar to the medical
community in which a defendant-physician practiced, and thus that an
expert witness was qualified to testify on the relevant standard of care
in a North Carolina medical malpractice case." As was evident from
the multitude of cases progressing from the trial courts to the court of
appeals on the issue of whether the expert witness was qualified to
testify on the standard of care, the meaning of same or similar
community and the prerequisites for establishing that an expert
actually knew the standard of care in a community were far from
clear.' Thus, when the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted
discretionary review for O'Maral4 and Crocker," there appeared to be
Courts Harken a Return to the 'Locality Rule' in Medical Malpractice Cases, N.C. LAW.
WKLY., Jan. 31, 2005, at 12, 12 (describing how a "narrowing" of North Carolina courts'
application of the "same or similar community" standard began after the North Carolina
Court of Appeals decision in Henry). This will be discussed more in depth in Part I.
11. See Mark Canepa, Making Your Way Through the Minefield of Expert Witness
Selection in Malpractice Cases in North Carolina, N.C. ST. B.J., Winter 2005, at 6, 6-8
(describing the lack of a "working definition" of the standard of care for medical
malpractice cases in North Carolina).
12. See id. at 6-7.
13. See id. at 7 (portraying § 90-21.12 as "a minefield for lawyers on both sides of the
bar, leaving a trail of summary judgments, directed verdicts, and reversed decisions in its
wake"); see also Barringer v. Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med. Ctr., 197 N.C. App. 238,
251, 677 S.E.2d 465, 474 (2009) (reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
"all claims which depended on the testimony" of an expert witness found unqualified to
testify on the relevant standard of care); Crocker v. Roethling, 184 N.C. App. 377, 646
S.E.2d 442, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 644, at *1 (2007) (unpublished table decision)
(affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants), rev'd, 363 N.C.
140, 675 S.E.2d 625 (2009); Purvis, 175 N.C. App. at 480, 624 S.E.2d at 385 (affirming the
trial court's exclusion of an expert witness when the expert became familiar with the
community in question based on Internet materials dated four years after the incident
giving rise to the litigation); Treat v. Roane, 179 N.C. App. 436, 634 S.E.2d 273, 2006 N.C.
App. LEXIS 1875, at *18 (2006) (unpublished table decision) (finding no error in the trial
court's exclusion of plaintiffs medical expert testimony for the expert's failure to meet the
requirements of § 90-21.12 "to establish the applicable standard of care"); Leatherwood v.
Ehlinger, 151 N.C. App. 15, 22-23, 564 S.E.2d 883, 888 (2002) (reversing the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendants after finding that the expert witness was
sufficiently familiar with the standard of care in Asheville, North Carolina).
14. O'Mara v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 362 N.C. 85, 659 S.E.2d 1 (2007)
(granting discretionary review), disc. review improvidently allowed by 363 N.C. 117, 678
S.E.2d 658 (2009).
15. Crocker v. Roethling, 361 N.C. 691, 654 S.E.2d 250 (2007) (granting discretionary
review).
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a "golden opportunity" for the court to clarify section 90-21.12's
requirements and application, and to "restore sanity to an area of law
that has suffered for too long beneath a shroud of confusion."16
However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina fell short of
establishing a clear guide for qualifying an expert to testify under
section 90-21.12. In O'Mara, the Supreme Court ultimately
determined that discretionary review was improvidently allowed and
did not decide the matter." In Crocker, the court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants and remanded
the case to the trial court.18 The opinion did not clarify the pervasive
question of how to satisfy section 90-21.12's requirement that an
expert witness in a medical malpractice case testify on the standard of
care of the "same or similar community."19 Crocker ultimately
returned to the Supreme Court of North Carolina with a petition for
writ of mandamus, which the high court denied.20 Thus, the court, in
effect, "punted" on this issue. As a result, the question of how to
establish that an expert is qualified to testify about the standard of
care in the defendant doctor's community was left open.21
The "same or similar community" approach under section 90-
21.12, with clarification, can be effectively and efficiently
implemented by requiring an expert witness to demonstrate his
familiarity with the defendant's medical community, or a community
established as being similar, and showing how that familiarity enables
the expert to ascertain the relevant standard of care. Showing that the
expert witness is actually familiar with the medical community at
issue will ensure that the expert is truly qualified to testify on the
applicable standard of care.22 In addition, doing so will guarantee that
physicians are held to a standard that takes into account the realities
of their medical communities.'
16. Mark McGrath, Sanity Restored? N.C. Supreme Court to Revisit 'Same or Similar
Communities' Standard, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 14,2008, at 3, 3.
17. O'Mara v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis. 363 N.C. 117, 117, 678 S.E.2d 658, 658
(2009).
18. Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 149, 675 S.E.2d 625, 632 (2009).
19. See Crocker, 363 N.C. at 147, 675 S.E.2d at 631 ("[There is no] particular method
by which a medical doctor must become 'familiar' with a given community. Many methods
are possible, and our jurisprudence indicates our desire to preserve flexibility in such
proceedings.").
20. Crocker v. Roethling, No. 374PA07-3, 2009 N.C. LEXIS 891, at *1 (N.C. 2009)
(dismissing petition for mandamus).
21. See Crocker, 363 N.C. at 147, 675 S.E.2d at 631.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.C.3.
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In contrast to section 90-21.12, which takes the defendant's
medical community into consideration when determining the relevant
standard of care, a national standard of care looks at whether a
physician's actions failed to meet the "level of care, knowledge, and
skill that reasonably competent physicians in the national medical
community would ordinarily exercise when acting in the same or
similar circumstances." 24 Though some argue that a national standard
of care should be imposed in North Carolina,25 a national standard of
care is not necessary to appropriately resolve medical malpractice
claims or to resolve the confusion surrounding qualifications for
expert witnesses to testify on the relevant standard of care in North
Carolina.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on
section 90-21.12 and the current state of the law in North Carolina
regarding qualifying expert witnesses in a medical malpractice claim. 26
Part II discusses and responds to arguments for imposing a national
standard of care, which would disregard the North Carolina "same or
similar community" standard of care.27 Part III explores why a
national standard of care and alternative methods are not the
appropriate remedy for North Carolina medical malpractice law and
24. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, & Other Healers § 202 (2010).
25. See McGrath, supra note 10, at 13 (arguing that "the time has come to scrap the
same or similar communities standard altogether").
26. A plaintiff must show four distinct elements in order to successfully litigate a
medical malpractice claim. See THOMAS W.H. ALEXANDER ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA
TORT LAW, 2000, at 555 (2000). First, she must establish the standard of care. See id.
Second, she must demonstrate a breach of that established standard by the defendant. See
id. Third, she must establish that the defendant's breach of the standard of care was the
proximate cause of her injuries. See id. Finally, she must show "damages," or that the
plaintiff was indeed injured by the defendant's breach. See id.
27. Throughout this Comment, the term "standard of care" refers to the measurement
to which a medical professional is held when determining whether she is liable for
professional malpractice. See id. at 555-57. In an ordinary, non-professional negligence
case, a standard of care is not typically set out for the jury because the activities that the
defendant was involved in are those that the jury is most likely familiar with. See Page
Keeton, Medical Negligence-The Standard of Care, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 351, 351-52
(1978). Thus, the jury can effectively evaluate whether the defendant "fail[ed] to exercise
ordinary care under the circumstances" in carrying out that activity because they are only
required to "evaluate the conduct of a normal person while in the performance of an
activity commonly engaged in by the public." Id. (emphasis omitted). In contrast, "the
risks and hazards related to the delivery of health care services are not commonly known,"
so a jury will be unable to determine whether the defendant fell short of exercising
reasonable care without first being told what that reasonable care is. Id. at 353.
Furthermore, what a non-medical professional would do in a medical situation is different
from the standard applied to a defendant-physician due to the differences in medical
training and knowledge between a medical professional and a non-medical professional.
See id.
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why, with clarification, the current "same or similar community"
standard used in North Carolina is fitting. Part III then discusses how
the current "same or similar community" standard can be applied in
practice to ensure that experts have sufficient familiarity with the
defendant-physician's medical community to testify on the relevant
standard of care, while still maintaining efficiency and effectiveness in
implementation. This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina was correct in upholding section 90-21.12's
requirement that an expert witness ground his testimony in the
defendant-doctor's same or similar community, but maintains that
there must be further clarification on the practical application of the
rule.
I. THE ROAD TO SECTION 90-21.12
A. The Use of Experts in Medical Malpractice
In North Carolina, any plaintiff claiming that a health care
provider28 committed medical malpractice by not meeting the
standard of care required of health care providers under section 90-
21.12 must show that an expert witness examined the defendant-
physician's work.29 The expert witness must be "reasonably expected"
to meet the qualification requirements under Rule 702 of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence30 and must testify that the medical care
provided by the defendant-physician did not meet the relevant
28. A health care provider is
any person who ... is licensed, or is otherwise registered or certified to engage in
the practice of or otherwise performs duties associated with any of the following:
medicine, surgery, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, midwifery, osteopathy,
podiatry, chiropractic, radiology, nursing, physiotherapy, pathology,
anesthesiology, anesthesia, laboratory analysis, rendering assistance to a physician,
dental hygiene, psychiatry, psychology; or a hospital or a nursing home; or any
other person who is legally responsible for the negligence of such person, hospital
or nursing home; or any other person acting at the direction or under the
supervision of any of the foregoing persons, hospital, or nursing home.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 (2009).
29. N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j)(1); see also Mozingo v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 101 N.C.
App. 578, 584, 400 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1991) (stating that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
case "must prove 'that defendant was negligent in his care of plaintiff and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries and damage' " (quoting Beaver v.
Hancock, 72 N.C. App. 306, 311, 324 S.E.2d 294, 298 (1985))), aff'd, 331 N.C. 182, 415
S.E.2d 341 (1992).
30. N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j)(1).
239
240 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
standard of care. While ordinary negligence claims allow a jury to
determine whether a defendant exhibited the care of a reasonable
person, medical malpractice claims compare the defendant-
physician's actions to those of other physicians due to the nature of
health care work.32 Likewise, the average layperson does not have the
"specialized knowledge" needed to make this comparison, so the
testimony of an expert witness is used to determine the relevant
standard of care and decide whether the defendant-physician's work
met that standard.33
The testimony of an expert witness is required to establish two
essential elements of the plaintiff's claim.' First, testimony of an
expert witness is used to establish the duty element of a professional
malpractice case; an expert witness must testify on the standard of
care that the defendant-physician is held to and whether the
defendant-physician violated that standard." Second, the use of
expert testimony is used to show whether the "defendant's treatment
proximately caused [the] plaintiff's injury," which satisfies the
31. Id. Rule 9 further provides that a medical malpractice action will not be dismissed
if the plaintiff shows that the "medical care has been reviewed by a person that the
complainant will seek to have qualified as an expert witness by motion under Rule 702(e)
of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify," or that "the pleading alleges facts
establishing negligence under the existing common-law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Id.
at 9(j)(2)-(3). Rule 702(e) allows a witness to qualify as an expert without meeting certain
requirements if he is "otherwise qualified as an expert witness," and there are
"extraordinary circumstances" such that the court determines that allowing the motion
will "serve the ends of justice." N.C. R. EVID. 702(e). "Res ipsa loquitur" refers to conduct
so blatantly negligent that a jury would be able to ascertain that the defendant doctor
breached the standard of care even without an expert witness to establish what the
standard of care is. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 575; see also Tice v. Hall,
310 N.C. 589, 593, 313 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1984) (stating that if res ipsa loquitur is applied,
"the nature of the occurrence and the inference to be drawn supply the requisite degree of
proof to carry the case to the jury without direct proof of negligence"); id. at 592, 313
S.E.2d at 567 (explaining that res ipsa loquitur is typically seen in " 'instances where
foreign bodies, such as sponges, towels, needles, glass, etc., are introduced into the
patient's body during surgical operations and left there' " (quoting Mitchell v. Saunders,
219 N.C. 178, 182, 13 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1941))).
32. See Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an
Elusive Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 428 (2009).
33. Leatherwood v. Ehlinger, 151 N.C. App. 15, 20, 564 S.E.2d 883, 886 (2002) (citing
Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 175, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1983)).
34. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 555.
35. See Mozingo v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 101 N.C. App. 578, 585, 400 S.E.2d
747, 750-51 (1991) (stating that a physician has "a duty ... to conform to the statutory
standard of care" that arises "[w]hen a physician and a patient enter into a consensual
physician-patient relationship for the provision of medical services"); see also id. at 588,
400 S.E.2d at 753 (explaining that "the issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law
for the court").
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causation element of a professional malpractice case.36 As a medical
malpractice claim will be dismissed if a plaintiff fails to establish any
essential element of the claim," establishing the relevant standard of
care through expert testimony is essential to the plaintiff's case."
North Carolina imposes two separate qualification analyses on
proposed expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases. The first
qualification requires the expert witness to be a qualified medical
expert under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.39
The rule enables qualified witnesses to use opinion testimony in all
situations where the witness's proficiency in the subject matter will
help the jury "understand the evidence or ... determine a fact in
issue."40 However, if the expert witness is being used in a medical
malpractice case, Rule 702 imposes stricter requirements on the
qualification of that witness.41 First, the expert must be licensed to
provide health care services in the United States.4 2 Second, if the
defendant-physician specializes in a particular field of medicine, the
expert's specialty must be the same as or similar to the defendant's
specialty.4 3 Likewise, the expert must perform similar procedures and
"treat[] similar patients" as the defendant-physician." Third, the
expert must have spent the majority of her time in "active clinical
practice" in the defendant-physician's specific line of work or
teaching students in a classroom or clinical setting in the defendant's
same line of work.4 5 Fourth, a doctor must have appropriate
36. Tripp v. Pate, 49 N.C. App. 329, 332, 271 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1980) (citing Ballenger
v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 54, 247 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1978)).
37. See Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C. App. 234, 237, 278 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1981) (stating
that the essential elements of a medical malpractice case are "(1) the standard of care; (2)
breach of the standard of care; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damages"); see also Treat
v. Roane, 179 N.C. App. 436, 634 S.E.2d 273, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1875, at *7 (2006)
(unpublished table decision) ("The burden is on the plaintiff to establish the standard of
care through expert testimony."). A party moving for summary judgment must establish
either that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate " 'an essential element of [his] claim' "; that
"'an essential element of [the] claim' " cannot be supported by sufficient evidence; or that
a " 'plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim.' "
Mozingo, 101 N.C. App. at 583, 400 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Raritan River Steel Co. v.
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 101 N.C. App. 1, 4,398 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1990), rev'd, 329 N.C.
646, 407 S.E.2d 178 (1991)).
38. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 558.
39. N.C. R. EVID. 702(a)-(h).
40. Id. at 702(a). The expert witness must be "qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education." Id.
41. Id. at 702(b).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 702(b)(1).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 702(b)(2)-(c).
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"knowledge of the applicable standard of care" required of health
care professionals.46 However, Rule 702 provides that even if all of
these requirements are met, the trial judge may still "disqualify an
expert witness on [other] grounds."4 7
The second qualification for expert witnesses requires the expert
witness to be sufficiently familiar with the relevant standard of care in
"same or similar communities" under section 90-21.12.48 The trial
judge makes the preliminary determination of whether the expert
witness has met these requirements and is thus qualified to testify.49
In doing so, the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to
admit the testimony of a proposed expert witness. 0 As a result, only a
finding of an "abuse of discretion" will cause the trial court's decision
regarding the two qualification requirements to be reversed."
However, these preliminary determinations by the trial court only go
so far as to determine whether the witness's testimony is admissible
based on the expert's qualifications and the reliability of his opinion;52
all questions regarding the weight and credibility of the expert's
testimony are left for the jury.
46. Id. at 702(d).
47. Id. at 702(g); see, e.g., Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103, 107 (4th Cir. 1958) (stating
that whether an expert witness is qualified to testify is within the trial judge's "sound
discretion").
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009). This qualification requirement is discussed in
depth infra Parts II and III.
49. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004)
(citing N.C. R. EVID. 104(a)).
50. Id. (citing State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 140, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984)).
51. Id.
52. See Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 144, 675 S.E.2d 625, 629 (2009). It is worth
noting that the "reliability" of an expert's testimony is a determination of whether the
"scientific or technical area underlying a qualified expert's opinion is sufficiently reliable"
to form the basis of the expert witness's opinion. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460-61, 597 S.E.2d
at 687-88. For a medical malpractice case, the expert's testimony must establish the
applicable standard of care to which the defendant-physician must be held. See § 90-21.12.
Thus, in a medical malpractice case, the expert's knowledge of the defendant's community
which enables the expert to ascertain the standard of care in the same or similar
community is the information "underlying" the expert's opinion. See id. As a result, the
question of whether an expert is sufficiently familiar with the defendant's community to
know what the relevant standard of care is can be thought of as determining whether the
expert's testimony is reliable.
53. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460-61, 597 S.E.2d at 687-88 (citing Queen City Coach Co.
v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 323, 11 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1940)); see also Crocker, 363 N.C. at 147, 675
S.E.2d at 631 ("[M]atters of credibility are for the jury, not for the trial court.").
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B. The Demise of the Locality Rule
In the early 1900s, North Carolina had an even narrower
standard to qualify witnesses as medical experts.54 This standard,
sometimes known as the "locality rule," required an expert witness to
testify that the defendant-physician breached the standard of care of a
physician in the " 'same' locality."" This rule was established during a
time when the education and training of doctors was less formal and
less standardized.56 Furthermore, during this time, doctors often
practiced in remote communities with little access to continuing
education or communication with one another." As a result of limited
access to other medical communities, doctors were not held to a
standard of care beyond their own community." As North Carolina
became less rural and the education of physicians and the practice of
medicine became more formalized and regulated,59 the locality rule
became " 'too narrow' "I and outdated.6 1 Furthermore, it was
54. See Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 140, 171 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1970).
55. Id. (quoting Harold N. Bynum, Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Rejection of
"Locality Rule," 46 N.C. L. REV. 680, 682 (1968)); see also Baynor v. Cook, 125 N.C. App.
274, 278, 480 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1997) (describing the "strict 'locality' rule that had
previously existed in this State"); Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in
Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 705 (2002)
(explaining how the locality rule only held "physicians .. . to the standard of care practiced
by other physicians in the same community as the defendant").
56. See Wiggins, 276 N.C. at 139, 171 S.E.2d at 396.
57. See id. at 139-40, 171 S.E.2d at 396-97; see also Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 257 N.C. 32, 40-41, 125 S.E.2d 326, 332-33 (1962) (Higgins, J., concurring) (describing
doctors' rudimentary practices at the turn of the 20th century); James 0. Pearson, Jr.,
Annotation, Modern Status of "Locality Rule" in Malpractice Action Against Physician
Who Is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R. 3d 1133, 1138 (1980) (explaining that the purpose of the
locality rule is to take into account the varying opportunities, experiences, and resources
available to doctors in rural and urban areas); Amy Lynn Sorrel, Liability by Locality:
Practical Standard or Outdated Notion?, AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2010), http://
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/01/18/prsaOll8.htm (describing the locality rule's
original intention of preventing doctors in rural locations from being held to the same
standard of care as doctors in urban locations).
58. See Wiggins, 276 N.C. at 139-40, 171 S.E.2d at 396-97.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 140, 171 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 166-67 (3d ed. 1964)); see also Rucker v. High Point Mem'l Hosp.,
285 N.C. 519, 527, 206 S.E.2d 196, 201 (1974) (explaining that a doctor may be held to a
broader standard of care if he or she is a staff member at a "duly accredited hospital").
61. See Wiggins, 276 N.C. at 139-40, 171 S.E.2d at 397; see also Michael Frakes,
Malpractice Standards of Care and Regional Variations in Physician Practice Styles 10
(Oct. 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/petrie-flom/fellowship-program/MalpracticeStandardsFrakes.pdf (describing
how geographic restrictions on standard of care laws were relaxed as disparities in doctor
education, training, and resource availability became less pronounced); Sorrel, supra note
57 (describing the standard of care as a "totally fluid concept" that can adapt to
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understandably difficult to find an expert witness "from the same
community to testify against a colleague."62 To account for these
difficulties and changes, the locality rule's requirement that an expert
witness testify on the standard of care in the defendant's community
was relaxed to allow testimony on the standard of care in similar
communities.63 As a result, the "same or similar community" view
emerged as the common law standard of care in North Carolina.'
C. North Carolina's "Same or Similar Community" Rule
Prior to the enactment of section 90-21.12,65 North Carolina
adhered to a common law "same or similar community" rule.66 This
common law rule expanded the relevant criteria on which to base a
defendant-physician's standard of care by enabling plaintiffs to
establish a defendant-physician's breach of that standard through the
testimony of an expert from a same or similar community. 67 However,
there were still vast differences in resources, education, training, and
facilities among different communities.68 As a result, the common law
"same or similar community" rule still considered the defendant-
physician's medical community.69 Therefore, by accounting for " 'the
changing conditions of social, commercial, and industrial life' " in
North Carolina while still acknowledging the realities of North
Carolina medical communities, the common law rule remained true
to " 'well-settled principles' " of North Carolina law.70
accommodate the reality that while the strict locality rule may no longer be necessary,
discrepancies between health care in different communities still exist).
62. Peter P. Budetti et al., Medical Malpractice Law in the United States, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., 6 (May 2005), http://kff.org/insurance/upload/Medical-Malpractice-Law-
in-the-United-States-Report.pdf (describing the difficulty in finding expert witnesses
willing to "point fingers at their fellow physicians"); Frakes, supra note 61, at 9-10
(describing the " 'conspiracy of silence' " that made it difficult to find expert witnesses to
testify under the strict locality rule); Keeton, supra note 27, at 359; see also Wiggins, 276
N.C. at 140, 171 S.E.2d at 397 (stating that there was an "insurmountable handicap"
whenever a plaintiff came from "a community with only one doctor"); Pearson, supra note
57, at 1139 (describing doctors' reluctance to testify against other doctors in the same
community as a reason for expanding the strict locality rule to allow testimony on the
standard of care of a similar community).
63. See Wiggins, 276 N.C. at 140-41, 171 S.E.2d at 397-98.
64. See id.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009).
66. See Wiggins, 276 N.C. at 139-41, 171 S.E.2d at 396-98 (reversing and remanding
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony based on adherence to the locality rule).
67. See id. at 140, 171 S.E.2d at 397.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 141, 171 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 138 N.C. 42, 42, 50 S.E. 452, 452 (1905)). The common law requirements for
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In 1975, the North Carolina General Assembly codified this
common law rule by passing section 90-21.12.71 Section 90-21.12
establishes the relevant standard of care for medical malpractice
actions as follows:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising
out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional
services in the performance of medical, dental, or other health
care, the defendant shall not be liable for the payment of
damages unless the trier of the facts is satisfied by the greater
weight of the evidence that the care of such health care
provider was not in accordance with the standards of practice
among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar
communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the
cause of action.72
The statute was meant to codify North Carolina's common law
"same or similar community" rule.73 As a result, physicians were still
standard of care were clearly set forth in Hunt v. Bradshaw, and included requiring a
physician to (1) "possess the ... learning, skill and ability" that would ordinarily be held
by other physicians "similarly situated"; (2) apply that "knowledge and skill" to the
"patient's case" with "reasonable care and diligence"; and (3) use her "best judgment" in
treating and caring for the patient. 242 N.C. 517, 521, 88 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1955).
Furthermore,
an expert witness, otherwise qualified, may state his opinion as to whether the
treatment and care given by the defendant to the particular patient came up to the
standard prevailing in similar communities, with which the witness is familiar, even
though the witness be not actually acquainted with actual medical practices in the
particular community in which the service was rendered at the time it was
performed.
Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 101, 199 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1973). This common law rule,
which balanced the need to take into account both the changes and remaining differences
in North Carolina's population and medical communities, represented the standard of care
that medical professionals were held to in North Carolina.
71. See Act of May 12, 1976, ch. 977, § 4, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 4-6 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009)).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009); see also Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 145
N.C. App. 208, 213, 550 S.E.2d 245, 248 (Greene, J., concurring) (establishing the elements
of the North Carolina statute as holding physicians to "a standard of care practiced among
other members of their profession (1) in the same or a similar community, (2) with similar
training, and (3) with similar experience" (citing § 90-21.12)), affd per curiam, 354 N.C.
570, 557 S.E.2d 530 (2001).
73. See Wall v. Stout, 310 N.C. 184, 192, 311 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1984) (stating that the
statute was written "to conform ... to the existing case law applying a 'same or similar
community' standard of care"); Howard v. Piver, 53 N.C. App. 46, 51, 279 S.E.2d 876, 879
(1981) (stating that the statute was intended to codify the common law rule of Wiggins and
Dickens).
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required to use the same care with patients as before enactment of
the statute,74 with no departure from "established principles of
malpractice law" and no "new standard of care."
There were several reasons for codifying the common law rule in
North Carolina. Codification led to clarification of the geographic
area to which a physician's standard of care applied76 and provided
guidance to health care professionals about the quality of care they
were expected to provide. In addition, section 90-21.12 ensured that
doctors were not held to a strict locality standard.78 As a result, the
statute accounted for the increasing standardization between
communities and the difficulties that arose from applying the locality
rule.7 ' However, the statute was also intended to prevent the
application "of a national or regional standard of care."so Thus,
codification ensured that the standard of care took into account
variations between communities.1
D. Lingering Uncertainty
Even after section 90-21.12 codified the "same or similar
community" standard, confusion remained over how to ensure that an
expert was sufficiently familiar with a same or similar community in
74. See Wall, 310 N.C. at 192, 311 S.E.2d at 576.
75. Makas v. Hillhaven, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736, 740 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (citing Simons v.
Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 493, 286 S.E.2d 596, 603 (1982)).
76. See id.
77. See Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical
Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1255 (1975).
78. See Baynor v. Cook, 125 N.C. App. 274,278, 480 S.E.2d 419,421 (1997).
79. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text; see also Cramm et al., supra note
55, at 706 (stating that one problem with the strict locality standard of care was the
concern that experts were often reluctant "to testify against another physician in the same
community").
80. Page v. Wilson Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 49 N.C. App. 533, 535, 272 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1980)
(noting the intent of the General Assembly in adopting § 90-21.12). The General
Assembly's report states that
[t]he North Carolina Supreme Court has gone only as far as a 'same or similar
communities' standard of care, and the Commission recommends that this concept
be enacted into the General Statutes to avoid further interpretation by the
Supreme Court which might lead to regional or national standards for all health
care providers.
Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 145 N.C. App. 208, 209-10, 550 S.E.2d 245, 246 (quoting
N.C. PROF'L LIAB. INS. STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1976,
at 32 (1976)), affd per curiam, 354 N.C. 570, 557 S.E.2d 530 (2001).
81. See Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 213, 550 S.E.2d at 248 (Green, J., concurring); see
also Tucker v. Meis, 127 N.C. App. 197, 199, 487 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1997) (finding expert's
testimony to be "irrelevant" because the expert only knew the statewide standard of care).
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order to be qualified to testify on the appropriate standard of care.
Though the stricter rules in North Carolina's history were outdated
and a solid shift to the "same or similar community" standard was a
welcome change, the diminished clarity of how to obtain an expert
witness was a casualty of the shift away from the locality rule.82 The
multitude of cases reaching the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
the years following the statute's adoption indicates the confusion over
the "same or similar community" standard.83 These cases examined a
variety of questions but had two recurring issues. One line of cases
examined whether a proposed expert witness was sufficiently familiar
with the defendant-physician's medical community to be qualified to
testify to the relevant standard of care.' A second line of cases
examined whether a proposed expert witness's medical community
was sufficiently "similar" to the medical community of the defendant-
physician such that the expert witness could testify to the standard of
care in the community at issue." The following riddle summarized the
82. See Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 707.
83. See, e.g., Tice v. Hall, 63 N.C. App. 27, 36-37, 303 S.E.2d 832, 837-38 (1983)
(reversing a directed verdict for defendant after finding that the expert witness sufficiently
established the standard of care for surgeons in Fayetteville, North Carolina), affd, 310
N.C. 589, 313 S.E.2d 565 (1984); Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 492-94, 286
S.E.2d 596, 602-03 (1982) (finding that the standard of care for Durham, North Carolina,
was properly established under § 90-21.12 even though the plaintiff did not specifically ask
whether the defendant "deviat[ed] from standard medical practice in Durham, North
Carolina, or in similar communities in 1975 and 1976" and that the expert witness stated
that board-certified surgeons adhere to the same standards across the country); Thompson
v. Lockert, 34 N.C. App. 1, 4-6, 237 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (1977) (holding that the trial court
properly excluded the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness due to a failure to show that
the medical community of Smithtown, New York, was similar to the medical community
of Salisbury, North Carolina).
84. See, e.g., Marley v. Graper, 135 N.C. App. 423, 430, 521 S.E.2d 129, 134 (1999)
(stating that the expert witness's failure to "testify that he was familiar with the standard
of care for Greensboro" was satisfactory in light of his testimony that the defendant-
physician "met the highest standard of care found anywhere in the United States");
Tucker, 127 N.C. App. at 198-99, 487 S.E.2d at 829 (holding that the trial court correctly
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict when plaintiffs expert witness "fail[ed]
to testify that he was familiar with the standard of care in Winston-Salem or similar
communities"); Mozingo v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 101 N.C. App. 578, 590-91, 400
S.E.2d 747, 754 (1991) (finding that the physicians setting forth the standard of care in
affidavits supporting defendant's motion for summary judgment were not shown to be
familiar with the standard of care in Pitt County, North Carolina), affd, 331 N.C. 182, 415
S.E.2d 341 (1992).
85. See, e.g., Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 213, 550 S.E.2d at 248 (holding that testimony of
plaintiffs expert witness was properly excluded and thus defendant's motion for a directed
verdict was properly granted based on the expert's failure to show that either a national
standard of care or the standard of care in Spartanburg, South Carolina, was the relevant
standard of care for Wilmington, North Carolina); White v. Hunsinger, 88 N.C. App. 382,
385-86, 363 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1988) (finding that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
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confusion over these issues: "When is a board certified medical
doctor with 20 years of directly related surgical experience not
qualified to testify as a surgical expert on the standard of care in a
medical malpractice case? When he or she is asked to testify in a
North Carolina courtroom." 86
As demonstrated in Crocker v. Roethling and O'Mara v. Wake
Forest University Health Sciences, confusion over interpreting section
90-21.12 is far from over.87 While the Crocker court reversed and
remanded the exclusion of the plaintiff's expert testimony, it
explained that
[n]othing in our statutes or case law suggests that a prospective
medical expert must produce documentation of his research or
attempt to explain to the trial judge how his knowledge about
the community enabled him to ascertain the relevant standard
of care. Nor do they prescribe any particular method by which a
medical doctor must become "familiar" with a given
community. Many methods are possible, and our jurisprudence
indicates our desire to preserve flexibility in such proceedings.
The witness must show only that "other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue. "88
No development in this area of jurisprudence has clearly
explained how to ensure that an expert has sufficient knowledge to
testify on the standard of care used in a "same or similar community"
and thus to testify on the relevant standard of care.89 In contrast to
current North Carolina law, implementing a procedure that requires
an expert witness to demonstrate his familiarity with the defendant-
physician's medical community and make the link between this
knowledge and his testimony on the applicable standard of care will
ensure that this confusion is alleviated, and that section 90-21.12 is
witness was not "incompetent" based on the expert "not practicing in a community similar
to New Bern at the time of defendant's alleged negligence").
86. Canepa, supra note 11, at 6.
87. See Crocker v. Roethling, 184 N.C. App. 377, 646 S.E.2d 442, 2007 N.C. App.
LEXIS 644 (2007) (unpublished table decision), rev'd, 363 N.C. 140,675 S.E.2d 625 (2009);
O'Mara v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 184 N.C. App. 428, 646 S.E.2d 400, disc. review
granted in part, 362 N.C. 85, 659 S.E.2d 1 (2007), and disc. review improvidently allowed by
363 N.C. 117, 678 S.E.2d 658 (2009); see also McGrath, supra note 10, at 1 (describing the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's "agreeing to review the cases of Crocker v. Roethling
and O'Mara v. Wake Forest University Health Sciences").
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effectively implemented in North Carolina medical malpractice
litigation. However, there are opponents of the "same or similar
community" standard of care who think that it is no longer relevant as
health care becomes more standardized. The next Part will explore
these arguments, and illustrate how the "same or similar community"
standard of care remains necessary and effective.
II. A WEALTH OF OPPOSITION: A DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE "SAME OR SIMILAR COMMUNITY" STANDARD OF
CARE
Although the "same or similar community" standard of section
90-21.12 can be appropriate and effective, there is opposition to this
proposition. Some argue that all forms of geographic narrowing in
determining the relevant standard of care are no longer necessary and
that a nationwide standard of care is now appropriate for all medical
communities."o This idea is based on two premises. First, proponents
of this argument say that there are no longer variations in medical
communities, so forms of non-national standards of care are an
"anachronism."9 ' Second, proponents claim that a national standard
provides a "floor" to ensure that all patients receive adequate medical
treatment.92 However, geographic variations in population and
medical practices still exist, making it impractical and unfair to
require all physicians to meet the same standard of care.93
Furthermore, the "same or similar community" standard was created
with the specific intention of acknowledging the improvements and
standardization that have been made in medicine by moving away
from North Carolina's historic strict locality rule.94
Additionally, critics of the "same or similar community"
standard argue that jurisdictions applying a standard of care other
90. See generally Michelle Huckaby Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician's
Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs. the National Standard of Care, 297 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 2633 (2007) (arguing for a national standard of care); Andrea Hughes, States'
"Locality Rule" Hurts Patients, GEN. HEALTH CHANNEL (June 20, 2007), http://
www.ivanhoe.com/channels/pchannelstory.cfm?storyid=16428 (arguing against the use of
a locality rule); Sorrel, supra note 57 (comparing the benefits and risks of both a national
standard and a locality standard).
91. See Lewis et al., supra note 90, at 2636.
92. See Hughes, supra note 90.
93. See infra Part III.
94. See Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 139-40, 171 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1970).
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than a national standard of care have diminished medical care. 5 This
argument is based on three premises. First, these critics claim that
requiring physicians to know the standard of care for the specific
community they practice in "imposes additional duties and legal risk
on physicians," and thus makes the job of physicians and other health
care providers more difficult.96 Therefore, proponents of this view
conclude that community standards of care distract the health care
provider; rather than focusing on her true job-taking care of
patients-she instead must expend time and energy to remain abreast
of the accepted practice of other providers in her community.97
Second, proponents of this view claim that such standards diminish
medical care by hindering the integration of medical and scientific
advances into the standard of care.98 Furthermore, these proponents
claim that these standards cause concern and indecision for doctors
when there is divergence between local and national practice
standards.9 9 However, under the "same or similar community"
standard of care, an expert witness can still testify on any national
uniformity of the procedure or treatment at issue.'" As a result,
applying the "same or similar community" standard of care will not
diminish medical care.o0 Instead, applying this standard will enable
health care providers to work with confidence within the reality of
95. See Lewis et al., supra note 90, at 2636; Sorrel, supra note 57 (stating that
physicians in states without a national standard of care must adhere to the standard of care
of their community, even when this standard is lower than that of other locations).
96. See Lewis et al., supra note 90, at 2634.
97. See id.; see also Peggy Peck, Standard of Care Remains a Moving Target in Medical
Malpractice Cases, MEDPAGE TODAY (June 20, 2007), http://www.medpagetoday.com/
PublicHealthPolicy/HealthPolicy/5971 (stating that physicians practicing in more than one
jurisdiction are required to know the standard of care for each location, which can detract
from the physician's focus on the patient).
98. Lewis et al., supra note 90, at 2633.
99. Id.
100. See infra Part III.B.
101. See C. Jerry Willis, Establishing Standards of Care: Locality Rules or National
Standards, AAOS Now (Feb. 2009), http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/feb09/
managing9.asp (stating that physicians typically make medical decisions with the goal of
giving patients the best care possible under the circumstances, regardless of the standard
of care applicable in their jurisdiction). Furthermore, the notion that implementing a
national standard of care positively impacts the quality of medical care provided is not
supported by evidence; tort reform efforts, which are sometimes viewed as an indicator of
declining medical care, are disproportionately found in states that have adopted a national
standard of care for medical malpractice lawsuits. Id.; see also Frakes, supra note 61, at 46-
47 (describing how applying a national standard of care still relies on the use of opposing
experts, thus minimizing the potential benefit of this approach).
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their own medical community." Therefore, adhering firmly to the
requirements of the statute will allow physicians to practice medicine
without the additional concern of being held to national standards
that may not apply to their medical community,"os and thus enable
them to focus their efforts and attention on caring for their patients.104
Furthermore, opponents of community-based standards of care
claim that requiring experts to know the standard of care in the same
or similar community is wholly unrealistic.' These opponents argue
that physicians do not know how other physicians practice-whether
in their own community or elsewhere-and, as a result, expert witness
testimony is often based on how the witness personally would have
acted (or thinks he would have acted) if in the same situation as the
defendant.106 However, this concern that expert witnesses are not
actually familiar with the appropriate standard of care can be abated
by requiring an expert witness to demonstrate his familiarity with the
defendant's community or one similar to it and how this familiarity
enables him to ascertain the relevant standard of care.107
Finally, opponents of community standards of care claim that
such standards give too much power to health care professionals.0 8
This claim is based on the assertion that allowing the standard of care
to be determined from the actions of health care providers in the
community "place[s] the profession above the law."10 9 Additionally,
102. See John C. Drapp III, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice
Actions: Does Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 95, 128-29 (2003) (describing how applying a national standard of care
causes physicians to "be preoccupied with thoughts about whether the actions they take
will lead to medical malpractice suits in which the plaintiff patient will bring in an out-of-
town doctor to testify to a standard of care that really is not applicable in the first place,
but is in fact legally applicable because of a supposed national standard of care"); see also
Sorrel, supra note 57 (describing how medical malpractice standards of care that address
the actual medical community that a physician practices in helps "keep[] the legal and
medical standards in sync").
103. See Sorrel, supra note 57 (stating that failing to consider the realities of a medical
community can "undermine the overall medical infrastructure" of rural localities).
104. Willis, supra note 101 (stating that most physicians understand their job is to
provide patients with the best care possible under the circumstances, not to minimize
medical malpractice liability).
105. See Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 710.
106. See id. (noting that an expert witness's determination of the community standard
of care usually relies on whether the expert "would not have treated the patient that way,"
or what "the expert personally believes should be the standard of care").
107. See infra Part III.C.1-2.
108. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87
IOWA L. REV. 909,958-59 (2002).
109. Id.; see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 191 (2000) (explaining
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these opponents argue that allowing physicians to set the standard of
care diminishes the role of the jury in medical malpractice cases by
requiring the expert, not the jury, to establish whether the defendant
breached the appropriate standard of care and is therefore liable for
medical malpractice.110 However, the North Carolina "same or similar
community" standard of care does not require an expert witness to
have actually practiced in the same community or state as the
defendant-physician."' The statute only requires that the expert
demonstrate familiarity with the medical community at issue and
illustrate how that familiarity enables him to know the relevant
standard of care.1 2 As a result, in contrast to the opponents' claims,
the physicians in the community at issue are not required to testify at
trial, and thus do not "set [their] own standard of care."113
In sum, some proponents of a national standard of care for
medical malpractice cases argue that non-national standards of care
are no longer necessary, diminish medical care, are unrealistic, and
give too much power to health care professionals. However, the
requirement of section 90-21.12 that an expert witness testify
regarding the standard of care of a "same or similar communit[y]"114
is better suited to determine whether a physician is liable for medical
malpractice because it takes into account the real conditions of a
defendant physician's medical community.'
III. A WORKABLE SYSTEM
A. Abandoning the "Same or Similar Community" Standard of Care
Is Not the Answer
This section will discuss why implementing a national standard of
care in North Carolina is unnecessary and unwise, as a national
standard of care is against the intent of the North Carolina General
Assembly and is imprudent in light of the remaining disparities
between North Carolina medical communities. This section will then
briefly explore some alternative ways of determining the standard of
that jurisdictions that have discarded standards of care relying on custom "have reiterated
the basic tort notion that an industry is not permitted to set its own standard of care").
110. See Peters, supra note 108, at 958-59.
111. See infra Part III.C.1.
112. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009); infra Part III.C.
113. Peters, supra note 109, at 191.
114. § 90-21.12.
115. See infra Part III.
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care in medical malpractice cases and will discuss why the "same or
similar community" standard of care remains the best option.
1. A National Standard of Care Is Not the Answer
The criticisms of the "same or similar community" standard of
care are also unconvincing because adopting a national standard of
care expressly contradicts the intent of the North Carolina General
Assembly.1 16 Legislators viewed variations in medical communities as
important factors to consider in medical malpractice cases."' While
the notion that all communities and physicians should be held to the
highest standards in treating patients is certainly ideal, the truth is
that all North Carolina medical communities are simply not equally
equipped. As section 90-21.12 evaluates physicians' conduct by
considering all factors that "are relevant and central to the legal
analysis,"' it effectively takes this reality into account. Therefore,
the statute allows physicians to focus on treating patients in the best
way that they actually can, instead of in a way that is beyond the
resources and capabilities of their medical environment.
Further, maintaining the "same or similar community" standard
of care is important because a national standard of care does not
accurately account for the realities of medical communities in the
state or in the nation. This is due in large part to the fact that
national, state, and even regional variations still exist between
medical communities, as general disparities between communities and
the medical services available to residents of those communities are
still present."' These disparities are evident in a number of ways; for
example, disparities between medical communities are illustrated
through differences in the "available medical resources ... conditions,
facilities, and equipment available to a health care professional,"1 20
116. See § 90-21.12; Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 145 N.C. App. 208, 210, 550 S.E.2d
245, 246, affd per curiam, 354 N.C. 570, 557 S.E.2d 530 (2001).
117. See Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 210, 550 S.E.2d at 246.
118. Id. at 217, 550 S.E.2d at 250 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
119. See Drapp, supra note 102, at 118-20 (discussing how "significant geographic
variation" exists in the availability of medical resources); see also Henry, 145 N.C. App. at
211, 550 S.E.2d at 247 ("This Court, however, has recognized very few 'uniform
procedures' to which a national standard may apply, and to which an expert may testify.");
Find Shortage Areas: HPSA & MUA/P by Address, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/GeoAdvisor/ShortageDesignationAdvisor.aspx
(last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (allowing a search for health-professional shortage areas and
medically underserved areas by address).
120. Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 213, 550 S.E.2d at 248 (Greene, J., concurring).
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diagnostic testing decisions, 121 "medically necessary" interventions,
"discretionary surgery," and disease management.122 These disparities
illustrate the necessity of a standard of care that considers the
defendant's medical community, because physicians must work with
the resources and facilities available to them. Therefore, physicians in
communities with minimal resources should not be expected to use
the same procedures, techniques, and treatments as physicians with a
plethora of resources. Disparities between medical communities are
evident in the classification of areas as "Medically Underserved
Areas," classification of areas as "Health Professional Shortage
Areas," racial make-up of communities, and rural versus non-rural
areas.
First, disparity in medical communities is evident from the fact
that 4,167,774 North Carolinians lived in "Medically Underserved
Areas" ("MUAs") as of 2006.123 A medical community is designated
as an MUA after a consideration of four variables: "ratio of primary
medical care physicians per 1,000 population, infant mortality rate,
percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level,
and percentage of the population age 65 or over." 124 These variables
demonstrate that a community designated as an MUA has some
combination of a shortage of health care professionals, poor health
outcomes, and a population that is likely without the means to seek
secondary medical care.12 5 Therefore, for a North Carolina
121. See Kathleen N. Gillespie et al., Practice Pattern Variation Between Two Medical
Schools, 27 MED. CARE 537, 537-38 (1989).
122. At Eisenberg Lecture, Wennberg Discusses Practice Variation, Urges Healthcare
Finance Reform, STAN. UNIV. CTR. FOR HEALTH POL'Y/CTR. FOR PRIMARY CARE &
OUTCOMES RESEARCH (Jan. 1, 2006), http://healthpolicy.stanford.edulnews/at-eisenberg
lecturewennberg-discusses-practice.variationurges..healthcare-financereform_20060
101/.
123. Sara Rosenbaum et al., National Health Reform: How Will Medically Underserved
Communities Fare?, GEIGER GIBSON/RCHN COMTY. HEALTH FOUND. RESEARCH
COLLABORATIVE, 7 (July 9, 2009), http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/
healthpolicy/dhp-publications/pub-uploads/dhpPublication_5046C2DE-5056-9D20-
3D2A570F2CF3F8B0.pdf.
124. Shortage Designation: Medically Underserved Areas and Populations, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/muaguide.htm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2010).
125. See id. "Secondary medical care" is specialized care and continuing, long-term
treatment for medical issues that are "common and less frequently encountered." JAMES
F. MCKENZIE ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY HEALTH 387 (6th ed. 2008).
This type of care is often necessary for patients with "chronic or long-term conditions" and
is usually given after a referral from a patient's primary care provider. Id.
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community to be labeled an MUA, variations in the medical services
available must exist. 126
These variables illustrate discrepancies in the medical care
available in different communities, as well as the unique concerns that
health care providers in these communities deal with daily. The
available resources and funding in a medical community form the
foundation for the care that local health care professionals have the
opportunity to provide; these resources essentially lay the foundation
for the appropriate standard of care to which health care providers in
each community should be held.127 These differences in "facilities,
equipment, [and] funding" even occur throughout the state, making
the variations even more directly linked to the need for a
differentiated standard of care.128 The "same or similar communities"
standard of section 90-21.12 takes into account these variations in
medical communities.129 As a result, section 90-21.12 holds health care
professionals accountable for the standard of care that is actually
available and possible in a medical community,13 0 instead of
exhausting doctors' efforts in trying to adhere to standards that are
not practical for the circumstances."'
Second, these disparities between medical communities can be
seen in the number of health care professionals available to serve a
given community. The differences in available health care providers
between communities is evidenced by communities' designations as
Health Professional Shortage Areas ("HPSAs"). While the MUA
designation takes into account a variety of factors to determine
whether an area has "a shortage of personal health services, "132 the
126. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 123, at 8.
127. See Tucker v. Meis, 127 N.C. App. 197, 198, 487 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1997); see also
Press Release, Univ. of Cal. at S.F. News Office, High Volume Hospitals Have Lower
Death Rates for Many Surgeries and HIV/AIDS (Feb. 29, 2000), http://news.ucsf.edul
releases/high-volume-hospitals-have-lower-death-rates-for-many-surgeries-and-hiv-aid/
(stating that high-volume hospitals have better health outcomes than low-volume
hospitals).
128. See Tucker, 127 N.C. App. at 199, 487 S.E.2d at 829; see also Sorrel, supra note 57
(discussing the need to keep "legal and medical standards in sync" with reality).
129. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009).
130. See Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 145 N.C. App. 208, 217, 550 S.E.2d 245, 250
(Hudson, J., dissenting), affd per curiam, 354 N.C. 570, 557 S.E.2d 530 (2001).
131. See Drapp, supra note 102, at 129 (describing how a national standard of care can
cause doctors to devote more time to considering the potential legal ramifications of their
actions than using their own knowledge, training, and experience to provide the best
medical care for patients).
132. See Shortage Designation: HPSAs, MUAs & MUPs, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERvs., http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010); see
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HPSA classification looks only at whether a given area has enough
health care providers to serve the community."' Throughout the
United States, there are 6,204 HPSAs for primary care physicians,
meaning these areas do not have enough doctors to provide the care
necessary to adequately serve the population or area.'34 As sixty-five
million people live in these areas, 16,643 primary care physicians
would be needed to meet the basic requirements for adequate
primary care in these locations, which is only a ratio of 2,000 residents
to one primary care provider."' Therefore, in areas with a severe
shortage of physicians, holding the available physicians to the same
standard of care as a physician in a location with a multitude of
doctors that can focus more attention on each patient seems not only
unfair, but impracticable.
North Carolina is no different, as disparities in the availability of
health care professionals exist throughout the state. 13 6 Thirty-eight
counties were designated as "Persistent HPSAs" in 2005, meaning
they had been "designated as HPSA by the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) from 1999 to 2005, or in 6 of the last
7 releases of [the] HPSA definition."137 As North Carolina has 100
counties, this means that thirty-eight percent of North Carolina
counties have a shortage of health care providers. 3 ' These
classifications are not insignificant, as far fewer medical school
graduates choose to practice in North Carolina's rural counties or
HPSAs as compared to metropolitan counties.13 9 Furthermore,
also supra note 124 and accompanying text (stating the variables considered in designating
an area as an MUA).
133. See Shortage Designation: HPSA Designation Criteria, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/hpsacrit.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
134. See Shortage Designation: HPSAs, MUAs & MUPS, supra note 132 (stating that
there are also 4,230 Dental HPSAs and 3,291 Mental Health HPSAs in the United States).
135. See id.
136. CECIL G. SHEPS CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF N.C. AT
CHAPEL HILL, TRENDS IN LICENSED HEALTH PROFESSIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA:
1979-2005, at 12 (2007) [hereinafter TRENDS IN LICENSED HEALTH PROFESSIONS].
137. N.C. RURAL HEALTH RESEARCH & POL'Y ANALYSIS CTR., UNIV. OF N.C. AT
CHAPEL HILL, PERSISTENT HEALTH PROFESSIONAL SHORTAGE AREAS (PHPSAS)
NORTH CAROLINA, 2005, http://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/rural/maps/PHPSAO5NC.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
138. See Shortage Designation: Medically Underserved Areas and Populations, supra
note 124.
139. See CECIL G. SHEPS CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF N.C. AT
CHAPEL HILL, 2005 NORTH CAROLINA PHYSICIANS: MEDICAL SCHOOL TRAINING
(2005), http://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/hp/publications/MDTrainFS05.pdf (stating that
only 24.3% of International Medical Graduates ("IMGs"), 18.6% of medical graduates
from U.S. or Canadian schools, and 19.7% of medical graduates from North Carolina
medical schools "list a primary practice location in a nonmetropolitan county," and only
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although the number of physicians available to serve each 10,000
North Carolina residents is increasing,14 as of 2008 there was still one
North Carolina county with no doctor actively practicing and twenty-
five North Carolina counties with fewer than seven physicians for
every 10,000 persons.14 While health care providers should always
provide the best care possible, as a practical matter, doctors in
communities with scarce resources should be held to a different
standard of care than those in metropolitan areas or large, well-
staffed, and resource-rich hospitals. It is unreasonable to apply a
national standard of care that does not take into account the realities
of the medical community.
Third, twenty-nine North Carolina counties were classified as
rural in 2005.142 There exist differences in racial demographics
between rural and metropolitan areas.143 Therefore, some areas are
likely to have disproportionate populations of certain racial groups.
This demographic difference can have an impact on treatment
outcomes, as evidence shows that different demographic groups react
differently to certain medical treatments and strategies.'" This shows
about 36.5% of IMGs, 30.1% of medical graduates from U.S. and Canadian Schools, and
27% of medical graduates from North Carolina schools choose to practice in counties that
are either "whole or part-county Persistent Health Professional Shortage Areas").
140. See TRENDS IN LICENSED HEALTH PROFESSIONS, supra note 136, at 12.
141. See Physicians per 10,000 Population North Carolina, 2008, CECIL G. SHEPS CTR.
FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, http://
www.shepscenter.unc.edu/hpl2008/maps/mdpop2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
142. See Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) North Carolina, 2005, CECIL G. SHEPS
CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, http://
www.shepscenter.unc.edu/rurallmaps/NC CBSA.Nov05.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
143. RUPRI State Demographic and Economic Profile Series: North Carolina, RURAL
POLICY RESEARCH INST., 4, http://www.rupri.org/Profiles/NorthCarolina2.pdf (last visited
Nov. 17, 2010).
144. See, e.g., NAT'L CANCER INST., CANCER HEALTH DISPARITIES (Mar. 11, 2008),
available at http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/disparities/cancer-health-
disparities; Juan Carlos Arango-Lasprilla et al., Traumatic Brain Injury and Functional
Outcomes: Does Minority Status Matter?, 21 BRAIN INJ. 701, 707 (2007) (discussing that
minorities often have worse outcomes than Caucasians one year after suffering a traumatic
brain injury); Paul S. Chan et al., Racial Differences in Survival After In-Hospital Cardiac
Arrest, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1195, 1199-1200 (2009) (finding that black patients were
less likely to survive to hospital discharge); Jana Kaida Silva et al., Ethnic Differences in
Perinatal Outcome of Gestational Diabetes Mellitus, 29 DIABETES CARE 2058, 2060-62
(2006) (describing differences in perinatal outcomes for babies born to certain ethnic
groups); Jeff Whittle et al., Racial Differences in the Use of Invasive Cardiovascular
Procedures in the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical System, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED.
621, 623-24 (1993) (finding that, even after accounting for financial and situational
disparities, black patients were less likely to use invasive cardiac procedures than white
patients); Black Women More Likely to Have More Aggressive, Less Treatable Form of
Breast Cancer, SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
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that different patients might have a negative or positive reaction to a
proposed medical treatment for a reason wholly separate from their
physician's ability to meet the applicable standard of care.145 A
national standard of care may not require the expert witness to be
familiar with the defendant-physician's medical community and with
the demographics of that community. As a result, a national standard
of care may hold a physician to an improper standard if factors
outside of the physician's control lead to a negative outcome. Since a
''same or similar community" standard of care requires an expert
witness to be familiar with the defendant-physician's medical
community, the expert witness must know whether the defendant-
physician was dealing with factors, such as demographics, that might
have impacted the medical outcome.14 6
Fourth, variations in medical strategies for treating patients exist
between different geographic regions. While there are ample
examples of this regional differentiation, a few are listed to illustrate
this point.147 Clear "geographic variation" exists for the "treatment of
... [heart attacks] in the United States."'48 These differences are
evident in the use of "aspirin therapy" and other pharmaceuticals,
surgical solutions, and even counseling to patients upon discharge.149
Also, the regularity with which different pediatric hospitals use
"[a]ntireflux procedures"' for children with gastroesophageal reflux
2007/09/070911214659.htm; Hispanic Women at Higher Risk for Breast Cancer-May be
Biological, SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/
04/070409082423.htm; Racial Disparities Seen in Male Breast Cancer Survival,
SCIENCEDAILY (Mar. 18, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/07031
7125448.htm; Studies Shed Light on Racial Disparities in Cancer Survival, SCIENCEDAILY
(July 13, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/07/090707161413.htm; Study of
Neighborhoods Points to Modifiable Factors, Not Race, in Cancer Disparities,
SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/04/0904130833
20.htm; Worse Breast Cancer Outcomes for Women from Poorer Backgrounds Are Not
Due to Late Diagnosis Alone, SCIENCEDAILY (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.sciencedaily
.com/releases/2010/03/ 100324085300.htm.
145. See, e.g., Findings Reveal Racial Disparities in Pain Treatment Outcomes, THE
MED. NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.news-medical.net/news/20100205/Findings-reveal-
racial-disparities-in-pain-treatment-outcomes.aspx (describing how different races react
differently to certain treatments).
146. See supra Part III.A.1.
147. See Peters, supra note 108, at 946 (describing how "physician practices vary
widely, even within narrow geographic areas").
148. Gerald T. O'Connor et al., Geographic Variation in the Treatment of Acute
Myocardial Infarction: The Cooperative Cardiovascular Project, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
627, 628 (1999).
149. Id. at 629-31.
150. Adam B. Goldin et al., Variations Between Hospitals in Antireflux Procedures in
Children, 163 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 658, 658 (2009).
2010] N.C. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
disease ("GERD") has "tremendous variation" relative to other
treatments such as "appendectomies, pyloromyotomies, and
gastrostomy tube placements.""' As this variation exists despite the
lack of regional "clustering" of GERD,152 and despite the
improbability that the variations are attributable to "significant
differences in each hospital's population," the variation appears to be
due to differing treatment strategies between hospitals. 153 In addition,
"pediatric hospital admission rates" for "pneumonia and
bronchitis/asthma" vary between communities within the same
state.154 These variations in medical treatment strategies come from
the fact that medical problems are extremely multifaceted and
complex.55 This complexity means that there is great "variety in
possible therapeutic responses" to each medical problem, and each
physician likely possesses different "preferences and . .. knowledge of
medical literature and practices."' 56 Therefore, preferred treatment
strategies are likely to vary from place to place depending on the
training and custom of that location; the customary treatment in one
location might not be the accepted practice in another location. 57 The
"one-size-fits-all" approach of a national standard of care will not
always be appropriate.
2. A Discussion of Alternative Approaches
The proposed implementation of section 90-21.12 will ensure
that the "same or similar communities" standard of care is workable
and appropriate in North Carolina medical malpractice cases. This
151. Id. at 660-61.
152. Id. at 661.
153. Id.
154. Susan M. C. Payne et al., Variations in Pediatric Pneumonia and
Bronchitis/Asthma Admission Rates, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED.
162, 162-64 (1995).
155. See Peters, supra note 108, at 947 (noting the "highly differentiated nature" of
medicine).
156. Id.
157. See Advice for New EM Grads, MOVIN' MEAT (June 11, 2008, 6:30 AM),
http://alibleedingstops.blogspot.com (advising newly-hired physicians to "[f]igure out the
local standard of care," as "[e]very hospital handles stuff differently"). The blog gives
examples of possible variations in hospitals, asking: "Do they admit syncope? Is there a
rapid chest pain protocal [sic]? Does your group write admitting orders? Who admits GI
bleeds? How sick do you need to be to get into the ICU? Conscious sedation?" Id. The
blog then advises the young physicians to adhere to the local methods, treatments, and
protocol, by saying "[d]on't rock the boat (yet)." Id.; see also Peters, supra note 108, at 958
(stating that "medical customs differ widely and inexplicably from one location to
another").
158. See Sorrel, supra note 57.
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section will briefly explore other proposed methods for establishing
the standard of care. This section will then confirm the value of this
proposed procedure under section 90-21.12 as a simpler, more
efficient way to determine the applicable standard of care.
a. Objective Geographic Survey Approach59
One proposed method of establishing the standard of care for
medical malpractice cases uses "surveys of a relevant population of
physicians to determine [the standard of] care."" This method relies
on surveys of other physicians' responses to a medical case to
determine whether the treatment and care provided by a defendant-
physician in a certain circumstance was appropriate or reasonable.'1
Likewise, this method may rely on "statistical data about doctors'
performance [s]" to ascertain the standard of care and the appropriate
responses to given medical situations. 62 While this approach claims to
provide a more reliable representation of the standard of care in a
given community and to minimize the jury's need to rely on the
"credibility or ... sympathy" of a witness,163 there are several likely
problems. First, requiring the standard of care to be derived from
objective studies that survey a certain geographic region's approach
to medical care would likely be costly. Second, there is a desire to
avoid using a " 'mechanistic and rigorous' " method of qualifying
expert witnesses to testify in medical malpractice cases.'" Surveys
may also be more impractical in "cases in which the relevant facts are
... lengthy [or] in dispute and can [not] be readily extracted from the
medical records."'6  Finally, there is the persistent truth that
"statistical analysis is itself subject to error, "'" which would discredit
any claim to this method's greater accuracy. Therefore, the thorough
159. This Comment refers to the variety of proposals that deal with using broad,
objective studies to determine the standard of care in a given area as "Objective
Geographic Survey Approaches."
160. Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 726.
161. Id. at 726-29.
162. William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629,
631 (2001) (emphasis omitted); see also Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to
Prove the Malpractice Standard of Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 821, 821 (2002) (discussing the pros and cons of
"supplement[ing] expert opinion testimony in medical malpractice cases with more
objective empirical evidence").
163. Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 162, at 641.
164. Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 150, 675 S.E.2d 625, 633 (2009) (quoting
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 464, 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (2004)).
165. Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 734.
166. Meadow & Sunstein, supra note 162, at 642.
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application of section 90-21.12 in North Carolina is likely less costly
and more practical than (and as accurate as) the proposed objective
survey approaches.
b. Reasonableness Approach
Another proposed approach requires determining whether a
physician acted reasonably in a given situation, instead of determining
if she breached an established standard of care."7 This approach
treats medical malpractice cases more like ordinary negligence cases
because it relies on whether the defendant acted as a reasonable,
prudent person would act.'68 Under this method, the jury has a
greater role in determining the liability of a defendant since it
ultimately sets the standard for the defendant and tailors that
standard to the "values of the community."'69
However, the practice of medicine involves specialized
knowledge, training, and experience not likely shared by the jury.'70
Therefore, asking a jury to apply a "reasonable person" analysis to
medical professionals is problematic.17' Furthermore, "articulat[ing]
the standard in terms of the reasonable, prudent physician" typically
does not eliminate the need for "expert testimony," so this proposed
approach does not appear to effectuate a "change in the way that
most malpractice cases are tried."'72 In addition, it is difficult to
reconcile North Carolina's system, in which the standard of care is
developed from testimony of qualified experts, with the "reasonable
person standard." 7'
167. Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 707-08.
168. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 16 (introducing the elements required
to show negligence).
169. Peters, supra note 108, at 959.
170. Id. at 921 (noting the concern that "lay jurors lack the training needed to evaluate
complex medical treatment decisions").
171. Leonard J. Nelson III, Helling v. Cary Revisited: Physician Liability in the Age of
Managed Care, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 776 (2002).
172. Id. at 776-77.
173. King, supra note 77, at 1245-46.
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c. Daubert Approach7 4
Finally, others propose that the approach developed in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,"' which guides judges to
determine whether the basis for an expert's testimony is valid,'76 can
be applied to expert testimony in medical malpractice cases."' This
approach is useful in "exclud[ing] expert opinion grounded on
incorrect factual assumptions ... [and] ensur[ing] that the expert's
opinion regarding the standard of care is based on valid science."1s
However, expert testimony on the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases involves the expert "merely stating an empirical fact
she has perceived."'79 This is inherently different from "expert
testimony in most other tort cases," which requires the expert to give
"an opinion derived from data or other scientific inquiry by
employing a recognized methodology."'s As a Daubert analysis is
"inapplicable to a percipient witness,""s' it is not likely the best
approach to establishing whether a stated standard of care is
appropriate. Furthermore, this approach conflicts with North
Carolina's reluctance for trial courts to take on a "gatekeeping"
role.m2
Despite arguments that a national standard of care or an
alternate approach should be implemented, the "same or similar
community" standard of care remains the best way to determine
whether a North Carolina physician is liable for medical malpractice.
174. The determination of whether a medical expert is qualified to testify in a medical
malpractice case has been distinguished from the role of the court in deciding whether a
scientific or technical expert's testimony is "valid" under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). While courts have a "gatekeeping" role in the
Daubert analysis, id. at 579, "courts have not been rigorous about screening experts based
on their qualifications or knowledge" and "have been more inclined to employ [a] laissez-
faire approach." Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 707. Whether an expert's opinion is based
on "valid" or "reliable" data or methodology is more pertinent to the determination of
whether a defendant-physician's breach of the standard of care caused the plaintiffs
injury, which is another essential element of a professional malpractice claim. See
Leatherwood v. Ehlinger, 151 N.C. App. 15, 23-24, 564 S.E.2d 883, 888-89 (2002).
175. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
176. See id. at 594-95.
177. See Nichole Hines, iBrief, Why Technology Provides Compelling Reasons to
Apply a Daubert Analysis to the Legal Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Cases,
2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0018, 2 (2006), http://www.law.duke.eduljournals/dltr/
articles/2006dltr0018.html.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 725.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 150, 675 S.E.2d 625, 633 (2009).
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The next section will discuss how implementation of the "same or
similar community" standard of care can occur in a way that allows
the existence of a nationally uniform standard to be considered when
appropriate.
B. Living in Harmony: Reconciling the "Same or Similar
Community" Standard with National Standardization of Health
Care
While the North Carolina statute plainly requires expert
witnesses in medical malpractice cases to testify to the standard of
care in a "same or similar community,"' the manner in which expert
witnesses can establish their familiarity with the relevant standard of
care and thus their qualification to testify under section 90-21.12 is
unclear. This section will propose a manner in which expert witnesses
can establish their familiarity with the defendant-physician's medical
community, and explain how section 90-21.12 can be effective as
health care continues to become more standardized across the nation.
In order to know the relevant standard of care, it seems
unavoidable that the witness must have actual knowledge of the
defendant's medical community, regardless of whether the witness is
testifying to the standard of care in the "same" community (i.e.
defendant's own medical community) or a "similar" community.
However, mere knowledge or familiarity with the defendant-
physician's medical community provides no inherent insight as to the
standard of care that applies to that community. Therefore, the
witness should be required to elucidate the link between the
knowledge of the community and the relevant standard of care. This
requirement will not infringe upon the court's decision in Crocker v.
Roethling, which stated that an expert witness is not required to
describe "how his knowledge about the community enabled him to
ascertain the relevant standard of care."" Instead, the link would
merely connect the witness's professed knowledge to his testimony on
the standard of care. This would serve to simplify the process for the
jury, similar to authentication of real evidence in a trial."' Thus, the
entire "link" could be made in a simple three step process: (1) "I am
familiar with defendant's community due to A, B, and C"; (2) "My
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009).
184. Crocker, 363 N.C. at 147, 675 S.E.2d at 631.
185. See State v. Williams, 191 N.C. App. 254, 662 S.E.2d 577, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS
1207, at *23 (2008) (unpublished table decision) (explaining that authentication is "a
condition precedent to admissibility" of evidence in a trial, and can be satisfied by a
witness's "[t]estimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be").
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familiarity with the community enables me to testify to the standard
of care used there"; and (3) "This is the standard of care . . . ." If the
expert happens to be testifying about the standard of care in a similar
community, only the first step must be changed: "I am familiar with
this community due to D, E, and F, and I know that this community is
similar to the defendant's community due to G, H, and I." This does
not need to be a rigorous process in every case. 186 However, a step
must be made between an expert's "superficial statements of fact
about the community in question" and the "expert's bald assertion of
familiarity with the applicable standard of care.""' Without this link,
there is no way for the judge to ascertain whether the expert is
actually helping the jury "determine a fact in issue," as is required by
Rule 702.' Thus, the link goes to a preliminary matter of whether the
expert is qualified to testify, rather than to a matter of credibility that
should be left for the jury. 18 9
Even with the "same or similar community" standard in place, a
national standard of care can still have a role in expert testimony. If a
national standard of care truly applies to the community at issue, it
will be one component of the standard of care to which the witness
must testify.190 Therefore, the expert witness should present
adherence to a national standard of care as part of the expert's
demonstration of familiarity with the defendant's medical
community.191 However, this does not eliminate the need for the
186. Crocker, 363 N.C. at 152, 675 S.E.2d at 634 (Martin, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 160, 675 S.E.2d at 638 (Newby, J., dissenting).
188. N.C. R. EvID. 702(a).
189. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 460-61, 597 S.E.2d 674,
686-88 (2004) (stating that "trial courts must decide preliminary questions concerning the
qualifications of experts to testify or the admissibility of expert testimony" but that
questions regarding "the weight to be afforded to" an expert's testimony should be left to
the jury).
190. Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 145 N.C. App. 208, 215, 550 S.E.2d 245, 249-50
(Hudson, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam, 354 N.C. 570, 557 S.E.2d 530 (2001); see also id.
at 212, 550 S.E.2d at 248 (majority opinion) (" '[I1f the standard of care for Greensboro
matched the highest standard in the country, [defendant's] treatment of [plaintiff]
exceeded that standard.' " (quoting Marley v. Graper, 135 N.C. App. 423, 430, 521 S.E.2d
129,134 (1999))).
191. Id. at 217, 550 S.E.2d at 250-51 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (stating that "there is no
reason why a jury should not be allowed to consider factual evidence of a national
standard of care" when "determin[ing] the applicable standard of care in each particular
case"). Thus, just as the expert's knowledge of the community's population, resources,
facilities, medical professionals available, among other things, will each be factors that the
expert will consider when determining the standard of care used in that community, the
existence of a national standard of care that applies to that community will also be taken
into account when ascertaining the standard of care used in that community. The jury's
determination will include the consideration of whether a reasonable physician in that
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expert to demonstrate actual knowledge of the community and the
means through which this familiarity enabled the witness to testify to
the standard of care. If experts do not demonstrate their familiarity
with the community, they fail to show that they have any real way of
knowing that the national standard applies to that community, and
thus, that the national standard of care is relevant.'" Furthermore,
testifying about a national standard without showing why it is relevant
to the community at issue ignores the requirements of section 90-
21.12.193 However, the national standard of care can be applied to a
North Carolina medical malpractice case after the expert witness first
establishes his familiarity with the community at issue, links that
familiarity to the standard of care, and compares that community
standard to a national standard.194 Thus, the court would not
disqualify an expert's testimony because of the mere mention of a
national standard of care.1 95
Ultimately, the jury should not be instructed on the national
standard of care, but should only be allowed to consider the expert's
testimony regarding the existence of a national standard in the
community at issue when considering "the greater weight of the
evidence."' 96 This is because the statute clearly requires that the final
standard of care that the jury considers when determining whether a
defendant-physician is liable must be the standard of care of a "same
or similar communit[y]," not the nation. 97 By implementing this
process for qualifying an expert witness to testify on the relevant
standard of care in a North Carolina medical malpractice case, the
community with the resources, facilities, personnel, population, and funding available in
that community would have (a) known that a national standard of care applied, and (b)
acted as she did.
192. See id. at 212-13, 550 S.E.2d at 248 (majority opinion) (holding that the expert
witness's testimony was "unfounded and irrelevant" because of the witness's failure to
show how familiarity with the national standard of care had any application to the
standard of care at issue); id. at 219, 550 S.E.2d at 252 (Hudson, J., dissenting) ("[H]ow
can you compare an apple if the only thing you've looked at is oranges?").
193. Id. at 215, 550 S.E.2d at 249 (describing the "crucial, albeit subtle, distinction
between adopting a national standard of care as a matter of law, and allowing a party to
present evidence of a national standard of care as a matter of fact").
194. Id. at 221, 550 S.E.2d at 253 (explaining that an expert witness can testify about a
national standard of care only if "he also specifically testif[ies] that he is familiar with the
standard of care in the community in question or similar communities based on his
assertion that the uniform standard is, in fact, the standard practiced in the community in
question").
195. Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 146, 675 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2009).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009).
197. Id.
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existence of a national standard of care can be a component of the
expert's testimony under section 90-21.12.
C. How Section 90-21.12 Can Be Efficiently Implemented into North
Carolina Medical Malpractice Law
As is evident from the North Carolina State Bar Journal article
advising attorneys on how to navigate the "minefield" of
requirements for expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases,
section 90-21.12 is not an easy statute to adhere to in practice.'98
However, this section briefly sets forth some suggestions for a
workable approach to expert witness qualification that will enable the
''same or similar community" standard of care to be implemented in
an effective and efficient manner.199 Courts should require expert
witnesses to demonstrate their familiarity with the defendant-
physician's medical community and show how this familiarity enables
them to ascertain the relevant standard of care.
1. Establishing Familiarity
The first step in determining whether a proposed expert witness
is qualified to testify under section 90-21.12 is to establish that the
expert is sufficiently familiar with the defendant's medical community
to know the standard of care.2'0 North Carolina's statute does not
prescribe a specific way that an expert witness must demonstrate his
qualifications. 201' However, "some acceptable method" of ascertaining
198. Canepa, supra note 11, at 6.
199. Although section 90-21.12, Rule 702, and Rule 9(j) set forth other requirements
on obtaining a qualified expert witness for a medical malpractice case, this Comment only
focuses on the requirement of section 90-21.12 that an expert testify about the standard of
care in a "same or similar community."
200. See Smith v. Whitmer, 159 N.C. App. 192, 196, 582 S.E.2d 669, 672 (2003) (stating
that a proposed "witness must demonstrate that he is familiar with the standard of care in
the community where the injury occurred, or the standard of care of similar
communities"). This Comment maintains that the expert establishes knowledge of the
relevant standard of care by demonstrating familiarity with the defendant's community
and then uses the established familiarity to show that the expert knows the appropriate
standard of care.
201. See Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 147, 675 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2009).
Nothing in our statutes or case law ... prescribe[s] any particular method by which
a medical doctor must become "familiar" with a given community. Many methods
are possible, and our jurisprudence indicates our desire to preserve flexibility in
such proceedings. The witness must show only that "other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue."
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the relevant standard of care is necessary.2" There are a number of
factors to consider.
First, the expert should have some knowledge of the medical
resources that are available in the defendant's community.203 This
includes knowledge of the community's "conditions, facilities, and
[the] equipment available to a health care professional." 21 Second,
the expert should be familiar with the demographics of the
community205 and any specific medical problems that may occur in
that community more or less frequently than in other communities.2
Third, the number of health care professionals in the community is
also relevant to being familiar with the medical community at issue, as
this will undoubtedly reflect the resources to which a community has
access, the extent of care that the community is capable of providing,
and the time and focus that health care professionals in that
community are able to provide to each individual patient.2' Finally,
the expert witness should know whether a national or statewide
standard of care applies to the community at issue. The presence or
lack of a broader standard of care is an important component of every
medical community, and an expert witness who is sufficiently familiar
with a community so as to be able to testify on its standard of care
should certainly have that knowledge.208
While the Crocker court states that "a prospective medical
expert ... [need not be required to] produce documentation of his
Id. (quoting N.C. R. EVID. 702(a)); see also id. at 150, 675 S.E.2d at 633 (Martin, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the North Carolina approach is decidedly less mechanistic and
rigorous than ... the federal approach").
202. Id. at 158, 675 S.E.2d at 638 (Newby, J., dissenting).
203. See Smith, 159 N.C. App. at 196-97, 582 S.E.2d at 672-73 (affirming the trial
court's exclusion of the expert's testimony after the expert "offered no testimony
regarding ... the resources available in the defendants' medical community").
204. Henry v. Se. OB-GYN Assocs., 145 N.C. App. 208, 213, 550 S.E.2d 245, 248
(Greene, J., concurring) (explaining that medical communities tend to differ based on the
above mentioned characteristics), aff'd per curiam, 354 N.C. 570, 557 S.E.2d 530 (2001).
205. See Purvis v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Serv. Corp., 175 N.C. App. 474,480-81,
624 S.E.2d 380, 385 (2006) (affirming summary judgment where expert failed to qualify for
lack of demographic knowledge).
206. See Henry, 145 N.C. App. at 217, 550 S.E.2d at 250 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
207. See supra Part III.A.
208. See Smith, 159 N.C. App. at 197, 582 S.E.2d at 673 (affirming exclusion of expert
testimony where expert failed to connect a national standard of care to the community in
question); see also Treat v. Roane, 179 N.C. App. 436, 634 S.E.2d 273, 2006 N.C. App.
LEXIS 1875, at *10-11 (2006) (unpublished table decision) (explaining that the expert
cannot merely state that a national standard of care applies to a certain community
without establishing that his knowledge of the community is the basis for his opinion).
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research," 2" having a witness to testify about a "same or similar
community" is an essential requirement of the North Carolina
statute.2 10 Although the ultimate determination should be whether the
proposed witness is sufficiently familiar with the community at issue
to determine the relevant standard of care, how the expert gained the
familiarity with the community is an essential part of determining
whether the expert actually has the requisite familiarity.211 If the
witness only claims to know the relevant standard of care, but in
reality lacks the familiarity with the defendant's community to either
know the community's standard of care or know that the community
is similar to another community for which the expert does know the
standard of care, an essential element of the plaintiff's case has not
been shown.212
However, if the expert shows her familiarity is grounded in
actual evidence, "the weight to be afforded to the evidence" is left to
the trier of fact.213 Thus, "[book or Internet research may be a
perfectly acceptable method of educating oneself regarding the
standard of medical care applicable in a particular community." 2 14
Likewise, a proposed expert witness need not "have actually
practiced in the community in which the alleged malpractice
occurred, or even to have practiced in a similar community." 215 The
definitive determination is whether the expert is familiar with the
community at issue or a similar community, for which the requisite
confirmation is flexible. 216 However, if the witness's sole knowledge of
the community at issue comes from a party's lawyer, an inherently
biased source, a jury will likely have reason to afford the expert's
testimony less weight even if the expert demonstrates familiarity with
the community.217
209. Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 147, 675 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2009).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2009).
211. See Treat, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1875, at *10-11 (disqualifying an expert who
failed to state why he believed a national standard of care applied to the community in
question).
212. See supra Part I.C.
213. See Crocker, 363 N.C. at 150, 675 S.E.2d at 632.
214. Id. at 151, 675 S.E.2d at 633 (Martin, J., concurring).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 146-47, 675 S.E.2d at 630-31 (majority opinion) (noting that the expert
stated that he was familiar with the community in question, which distinguished the case
from previous cases where the expert had not demonstrated that familiarity).
217. See Smith v. Whitmer, 159 N.C. App. 192, 196-97, 582 S.E.2d 669, 672-73 (2003)
(excluding expert's testimony where his professed familiarity with the community in
question was from a conversation with plaintiff's counsel).
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Furthermore, if the expert is testifying about the standard of care
in a community "similar" to the defendant's medical community, the
expert should still be required to demonstrate familiarity with the
defendant's community. Without establishing this familiarity, the
expert's assertion that the defendant's medical community is similar
to the allegedly "similar" medical community is baseless. However,
once the expert illustrates his familiarity with each community and his
reasons for calling the two communities "similar," the expert should
not be required to demonstrate why the standard of care in the
defendant's community is the same as the standard of care in the
"similar" community. If the two medical communities are accepted as
"similar," the standard of care in each community can be expected to
be the same; if there is a reason that the standard of care in one
community differs from that in the other, the communities are likely
not "similar" in the first place. Requiring the expert witness to
demonstrate familiarity with the defendant's medical community, or
likewise, to demonstrate familiarity with the defendant's medical
community and an allegedly similar community for which the expert
claims to know the standard of care, will limit disputes over whether
an expert is qualified to testify on the relevant standard of care under
section 90-21.12.
2. The Essential Link
After establishing sufficient familiarity with the pertinent
community, the expert witness must then make the connection
between the familiarity and his testimony on the relevant standard of
care. 218 This can be in the form of authenticating that the familiarity
with the community allows the expert witness to know the standard of
care of the community. This was seen in Leatherwood v. Ehlinger,21 9
where an expert established familiarity with the community and
stated, " 'Asheville and other [similar] communities ... practice in the
same national standards.' "220 Thus, the medical expert need not
"attempt to explain to the trial judge how his knowledge about the
community enabled him to ascertain the relevant standard of care" ;221
he must only state that there is indeed a basis for his testimony
regarding the standard of care, i.e., the familiarity with the
218. See Crocker, 363 N.C. at 160, 675 S.E.2d at 638 (Newby, J., dissenting).
219. 151 N.C. App. 15, 564 S.E.2d 883 (2002).
220. Id. at 22, 564 S.E.2d at 888.
221. Crocker, 363 N.C. at 147, 675 S.E.2d at 631; see also id. at 153, 675 S.E.2d at 634
(Martin, J., concurring) (opining that a voir dire examination of an expert need only be
utilized in "close cases").
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community.222 Requiring the expert witness to clarify how his
demonstrated familiarity with the community enables him to
ascertain the relevant standard of care and helps eliminate
controversy that may arise regarding whether the expert is actually
familiar with the appropriate standard of care and thus eligible to
testify in a medical malpractice case.
3. Why Do It This Way?
This proposed procedure requires expert witnesses to
demonstrate the evidence upon which their testimony regarding a
community's standard of care is based, in contrast to current North
Carolina law, which does not require an expert witness to express this
underlying knowledge. 223  Although seemingly complex, this
implementation of section 90-21.12 is necessary for medical
malpractice cases for a number of reasons. First, in order for medical
malpractice outcomes to be accurate and just, there must be an expert
witness that can attest to truly being familiar with the applicable
standard of care such that the expert witness can confidently give an
opinion on whether the defendant-physician breached that standard.
Medical treatment often involves making complex decisions based on
a multitude of factors, 224 many of which are inherently risky.225 As
physicians are specifically trained to make these choices and
undertake these responsibilities, they must be able to do so with the
confidence that can only come from knowing the legal ramifications
of their actions. 226 Thus, the efficient functioning of medical practice
depends on a physician's ability to rely on a clearly stated and
adequately supported standard of care that takes into account the
realities of the specific medical community at issue. Likewise, the
complexity of medical malpractice cases results in the need for an
expert witness.227 Requiring an expert witness to demonstrate his
familiarity with the community at issue, and thus with the relevant
standard of care, will "protect[] the jury from unreliable expert
testimony yet preserv[e] the jury's role in weighing the credibility of
expert testimony when appropriate." 228 In addition, the more
222. See Smith, 159 N.C. App. at 196, 582 S.E.2d at 672.
223. See Crocker, 363 N.C. at 147, 675 S.E.2d at 631.
224. See supra Part III.A.1.
225. See Keeton, supra note 27, at 359.
226. See King, supra note 77, at 1255 (arguing that a cognizable legal standard would
allow physicians to predict the consequences of their actions and eliminate the tendency
for physicians to practice defensive medicine).
227. See Crocker, 363 N.C. at 157, 675 S.E.2d at 637 (Newby, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 153, 675 S.E.2d at 635 (majority opinion).
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evidentiary basis there is for an expert's testimony, the more
credibility a jury will likely give to the testimony.22 9
Second, this suggested implementation of qualifying expert
witnesses under section 90-21.12 is necessary because it will help
ensure that the medical malpractice system is functioning effectively
by fulfilling its main objectives.23 0 Medical malpractice claims
purportedly deter physicians from acting negligently.2 31 Although
negative outcomes in medical care often come with a tremendous
amount of emotion, the fault does not always lie in the hands of the
health care provider; however, the "current malpractice system does
an extraordinarily poor job in identifying cases of true malpractice
and screening out iatrogenic injury occurring without physician
fault." 23 2 Applying section 90-21.12 in the proposed manner will
ensure deterrence, as physicians will know that there is a clear process
for finding a credible expert witness to testify against them in a
medical malpractice action if they fail to exercise care. Furthermore,
requiring potential medical experts to establish their familiarity with
the defendant's medical community and to link that familiarity with
their ability to ascertain the relevant standard of care in a same or
similar community will be a strong step towards correctly determining
whether a defendant-physician was actually negligent, because the
expert's testimony will be clearly based on the expert's factual
knowledge. If a physician believes that there is a medical malpractice
system in place that will punish physicians that are truly acting
negligently, she will likely attempt to perform her job with the utmost
care in order to avoid liability.
Third, applying section 90-21.12 in this manner will ensure that
victims who are truly injured by a physician's negligent acts will
prevail in medical malpractice actions and thus be "made whole." 233
Expert witnesses who are qualified under this proposed
implementation of section 90-21.12 will have already demonstrated
their familiarity with the applicable standard of care and their
knowledge that the defendant-physician breached this standard.2 3
229. See id. at 157, 675 S.E.2d at 637 (Newby, J., dissenting) (explaining that "lay jurors
will naturally accord great weight to expert testimony").
230. Andrew Brine, Note, Medical Malpractice and the Goals of Tort Law, 11 HEALTH
L.J. 241, 243-44 (2003).
231. Id. at 247.
232. Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 713, 715-16 (describing a study finding 83% of
medical malpractice claims "were filed against providers who had not been negligent").
233. See Brine, supra note 230, at 244.
234. See supra Parts III.B, III.C.1-2.
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Therefore, a jury will likely find this testimony credible, which will be
a major step towards reaching a fair outcome in a medical malpractice
trial.
Fourth, applying section 90-21.12 in this manner will serve to
educate physicians on the acceptable way to practice medicine in their
community. Negligence often arises among professionals due to
ignorance of the acceptable way to perform one's job.235 Requiring an
expert witness to demonstrate how he became familiar with the
defendant-physician's medical community and to describe how this
familiarity allowed him to know the relevant standard of care could
help inform other physicians in the local medical community. Not
only would doctors be on notice of the existence of their unique
community, but, more importantly, they could be better aware of the
standards to which they must adhere.236
Finally, requiring the expert witness to demonstrate his
knowledge of the defendant's community and how this knowledge
enables him to testify on the relevant standard of care will serve to
maintain the roles of judge and jury in the courtroom, thus
maintaining the nature of North Carolina's legal system. 37 If an
expert clearly demonstrates his familiarity with a medical community,
the witness's subsequent testimony is less likely to be challenged.
Whether the expert testifies that another community is similar to the
one in question, that a national or statewide standard applies, or
generally as to the standard of care, this link underlines how the
expert actually knows the relevant standard of care. As a result, the
link between the expert's familiarity with the medical community and
the standard of care does nothing but strengthen his testimony.
Furthermore, finding an expert witness who either has or is willing to
obtain the requisite familiarity with the pertinent medical community
is not a herculean task, as it often was under the locality rulem since
there is "ample opportunity to obtain supportive expert testimony in
malpractice cases. "239
235. Brine, supra note 230, at 253.
236. Cf. Drapp, supra note 102, at 128 (discussing the uncertainty a national standard
of care imposes on health care providers).
237. Crocker v. Roethling, 363. N.C. 140, 147-48, 675 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2009).
238. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also Drapp, supra note 102, at 124
(describing the unwillingness of physicians to testify as witnesses against colleagues,
referred to as the "conspiracy of silence").
239. Cramm et al., supra note 55, at 700; see also Drapp, supra note 102, at 125-27
(discussing how a national standard of care allows a party to "search for the witness who
will best support his medical and legal theories"); Peters, supra note 108, at 922
(describing the availability of "plaintiffs' attorneys and their hired-gun experts"). See
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CONCLUSION
Section 90-21.12 is appropriate to effectively and efficiently meet
the realities of North Carolina's medical landscape, while still
ensuring a just resolution to medical malpractice claims. Therefore,
changing section 90-21.12 to a national standard of care is not
necessary. Expert witnesses should be required to demonstrate their
knowledge of the defendant's medical community, and, if applicable,
a similar community, and to show the link between their familiarity
with that community and their testimony on the relevant standard of
care. Statements on the presence of a national standard of care should
not be barred, but should be taken in context as one element of the
expert's knowledge of the community at issue. Remaining true to
North Carolina's statute will bring predictability to both medical
providers and medical patients in North Carolina, as physicians will
be able to act with confidence, patients will know what to expect from
treatment, and patients will be aware of their rights within the
medical malpractice system.
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